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Resumo: Este artigo tem como foco a reforma previdenciária efetuada no ano de 2003 no Brasil.
São estimados os impactos fiscais da proposta original do governo, da versão aprovada na Câmara
e da versão final, aprovada no Senado. Também são calculadas as alíquotas de contribuição
necessária e efetiva, tanto na situação anterior às mudanças, quanto nas três fases da reforma. Os
resultados indicam que embora o impacto da reforma tenha se reduzido bastante em relação ao
projeto original, foi feito um avanço razoável no sentido de reduzir o déficit da previdência e torná-
la mais justa.
Abstract: This article focuses on the reform of Social Security in Brazil, initiated in 2003. We
estimate the fiscal impact of the original government proposal, as well as of the proposal approved
at the House of Representatives, and the final format approved at the Senate. We also estimated
both, the balancing contribution rate and the effective contribution rate, in the three phases of the
reforming process. Results indicate that although the final impact was considerably reduced from
the initial project, a great deal of progress has been made towards both, the reduction of annual
Social Security deficit and its transformation into a more equitable system.
Classificação JEL: H55
ÁREA 6: Economia do Trabalho, Economia Social e Demografia1
I.  Introduction
During the 1990´s, and particularly during the second half of the decade, Social Security in
Brazil had deteriorated to a point that had transformed it into the most critical fiscal problem in
Brazil. Increasing deficits, in both systems - INSS and Civil Servants – associated to a history of
differences in rights and rules had moved the issue of Social Security reform to the top of the
political and economic agenda in the country. In this context, the expression social security reform
had become usual in the media. Apparently, the debate has produced a consensus over two points.
First, it his accepted that the country needs a more fair and equitable system. Second, reduction of
the Social Security deficit is one of the pre-conditions for the balancing of the government budgets
and, as such, it is a critical pre-condition if the country wants to move towards a sustainable
economic growth trajectory.
During the two periods of the FHC administration, the government tried to change some
aspects of Social Security. However, attempts were not very successful, with the exception of
Constitutional Amendment 20 (EC 20). The fact is that whenever a government proposes to change
Social Security rules and rights, it is inevitable that the affected groups will resist. FHC
administration was unable (or maybe even unwilling?) to face and to overcome resistance of
affected groups against Social Security reform.
The picture changed during the first year of Lula administration. In April 2003, the government
delivered a bill to the Congress, Constitutional Amendment 40 (PEC 40). Based on correct
diagnosis of the situation, the proposal focused on the civil servants system, and had two main
objectives. First, it aimed to reduce the huge deficits of the Civil Servants system. Second, to
transform the rules and rights, making it more similar to the rules and rights of workers in the
private sector, and by this way, improving equity and social justice of both systems. The bill was
discussed in the House during four months. By late August, a modified text was approved and
delivered to the Senate. By December, after introducing new changes, the Senate approved the final
text – Constitutional Amendment Proposal 77 (PEC 77), which was finally sanctioned by the
President and became Constitutional Amendment 40 (EC41).
The process of political negotiation, inherent to a democratic system of government, has
changed most of the initial elements of the original proposal, both at the House and at the Senate.
The resulting amendment has lost a significant of potential fiscal impact of the original bill. The
changes reduced mainly the impacts on the present civil servants of both categories, the actives
ones as well the retired. The most important measures will affect future civil servants. The reform
was an important move, but its results will show up in the long run.
This paper evaluates the fiscal impacts of Lula reform of Social Security. After a brief review
of the literature on the topic of Social Security reforms (Section 2), and a brief description of the
Brazilian Social Security System (Section 3), we describe the data set (PNAD/IBGE Household
Survey, 2001), and the procedures we have used to assign Social Security rules to each individual
in the sample (Section 4). We then show how we have estimated individual wage and benefits
lifecycle profiles, and we describe the reform measures and the respective procedures to simulate
the reform (also, Section 4). Finally, we present the results on fiscal impacts (Section 5), and on
balancing and effective contribution rates (Section 6). Concluding remarks are then presented
(Section 7).
II. Social Security reforms
This paper is related to two groups of empirical works on Social Security systems. The first one
is formed by studies focusing on fiscal aspects, which address the issue of balancing revenues and
expenditures, and to long run sustainability
1. Two classical works in this line of research are
                                                
1 Goss (1999) lists possible methods of assessing solvency of Social Security Systems.2
Kotlikoff (1995) and Feldstein and Samwick (19967). More recently, we may refer to Smetters
(1999) and Lee and Yamagata (2003), who address the exhaustion of the American Trust Fund.
In the Brazilian, Schymura, Lannes and Perdigão (2000) have estimated the debt of the
Brazilian state systems, and Oliveira and Beltrão (2000) have estimated the impacts of CA 20 on
the Social Security debt, both for the INSS System (which covers workers of the private sector) and
for the civil servants. Mascarenhas, Oliveira and Caetano (2004) in a study similar to ours, have
used data of SIAPE (different from other studies that used PNAD/IBGE). They estimate that CA 41
will reduce the deficit by R$49 billions, in the 20-year period from 2003 to 2023. The authors have
argued that Lula reform will reduce the deficit, but will not balance the system. The National
Treasury will have to supply more than R$12 billions each year in the period.
The second group of studies focus on distributive and social justice issues. Giambiagi, Além
and Pastorizza (1996) have estimated the implicit subsidy associated to pension provided under the
length of service rule. Oliveira, Beltrão and Maniero (1997) estimate actuarially fair contribution
rates according to gender, schooling and kind of social security benefit. Schwarzer (1999) estimates
the impact on some groups of changes in the rules applied to determine the value of INSS benefits.
Groups were formed according to gender, labor market position, and schooling. Fernandes and
Grimaud (2003) used rules determined in CA 20 and estimate actuarially balancing contribution
rates for civil servants, according to gender, schooling, region, and administration level. The results
are quite high: the average contribution for the entire group of civil servants is about 73%.
Fernandes and Narita (2003) provide similar estimates for workers covered by INSS (private
sector), and their estimated average balancing contribution is about 33%.
Studies focusing on the estimation of rate of return of contributions also belong to this group.
Leimer (1999) reviews this literature for the American cases. For the Brazilian case, Fernandes
(1994) finds rate of returns below 4%, for all cohorts. In World Bank (1995), results are quite
different: the estimated rates of returns are around the 15% and 7,5% figures, for length-of-service
pensions, and age-pensions, respectively. An intermediate result is provided by Afonso and
Fernandes (2003). They do not provide separate estimations for public and private sector, however.
III - The Brazilian Social Security System before the Lula Reform
This section describes briefly the Social Security in Brazil and presents some figures to
illustrate the problems the country has been facing in the last years. It is a pay-as-you-go system
financed with payroll taxes, and has two very different regimes – the private sector regime and the
public sector regime.
The private sector regime is organized under INSS, which stands for National Institute of
Social Security, and establishes a contribution rate according to wage levels. There is a mandatory
minimum number of contributing years differentiated by occupations (in most cases 35 years) after
which the individual is entitled to the retirement. The value of the retirement benefit corresponds to
the average of 80% highest wages and salaries and its purchasing power should be kept constant
over time. If an individual does not contribute to the system, he or she is entitled to a benefit equal
to one Minimum Wage, after reaching an entitling age, which varies according to gender and rural
or urban areas, and begins at 60 for rural workers. Thus, the INSS regime provides two kinds of
benefits: length-of-service benefits, and age benefits. The later is a social assistance kind of benefit,
rather than a contributive benefit. Both kinds of benefits are adjusted annually for inflation.
The public sector regime also establishes a contribution rate according to occupational group,
level of administration (federal, state, and local). There is a mandatory minimum number of
contributing years, which varies according to occupational groups. In most cases, it is 35 years,
after which the individual is entitled to retirement. Brazilian civil servants are entitled to a right not
provided to private sector workers: the value of their pension benefit is equal to the last and highest
wage received (integrality). Salary increases given to active civil servants are automatically
incorporated in the value of the retirement benefits (parity). Finally, both regimes establish3
survivor benefits rules as well. After a beneficiary is deceased, the entire benefit goes to his or her
survivor spouse. Graphic 1 shows the earnings and benefit profiles of a typical Brazilian worker.
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INSS and Civil Servants figures (2001-2002)
2001 2002 Contributions, benefits
and net results R$ billions % GDP R$ billions % GDP
INSS
Contributions 62.5 5.3 71.0 5.5
Benefits 75.3 6.4 88.0 6.8
Results -12.8 -1.1 -17.0 -1.3
Civil Servants
Contributions 19.4 1.6 21.8 1.7
Benefits 56.4 4.8 61.6 4.7
Result -37.0 -3.1 -39.8 -3.1
Federal Administration
Contributions 7.0 0.6 9.4 0.7
Benefits 28.1 2.4 32.3 2.5
Result -21.1 -1.8 -22.9 -1.8
State Administrations
Contributions 11.0 0.9 11.0 0.8
Benefits 24.6 2.1 25.5 2.0
Result -13.7 -1.2 -14.5 -1.1
City Administrations
Contributions 1.4 0.1 1.4 0.1
Benefits 3.7 0.3 3.8 0.3
Result -2.3 -0.2 -2.4 -0.2
Overall Result -49.8 -4.2 -56.8 -4.4
Source: MPAS (2003a)
Table 1 presents revenues and expenditures of the two systems, INSS and Civil Servants
(disaggregated according to administration level), and shows the huge structural imbalance of the
situation. By 2002, both systems were running a deficit of more than 4% of GDP (this is the official
government estimate, which in fact under estimate the deficit). This situation has deep roots in the
past, although it has aggravated in the last years. For instance, up to 1993, state and city civil
servants contributions were collected just to fund survivor benefits. Only in 1998, it was
established the minimum age for retirement of civil servants, and even though, very low minimum
age: 53 for men, and 48 for women. In the INSS system, there is not a minimum age for retirement.4
Average retirement age in 2002 was 54 (49 in 1988). As a result of fast aging of Brazilian
population, the ratio contributors/beneficiaries has decreased very quickly, from 2.5 in 1990 to 1.3
in 2001 (MPAS, 2002).
To complete the picture partially depicted in Table 1, it is necessary to add that the number of
beneficiaries of both systems. By the end of 2002, there were about 2.8 millions beneficiaries in the
civil servants system (about 1.0 millions of them are survivors), and about 5.2 millions active civil
servants (MPS, 2004b: 40). In the same year, there were about 30 millions contributors of INSS,
and about 21 millions beneficiaries in the private sector system (MPAS, 2003b: 16). This means
that the per capita deficit in the public sector is much larger than the corresponding in the private
sector. For this reason, Lula administration has decided to first reform the public sector system of
Social Security.
IV – Methodology: Data set, Pension benefit rules, and estimation of wage/salary- and benefit
profiles
Data used in this study come from the 2001 Brazilian Household Surveys (Pesquisa Nacional
por Amostra de Domicílios - PNAD), provided by Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística
(IBGE), the Brazilian Census Bureau. PNAD is an annual population survey (similar to the Current
Population Survey in the United States) that covers all urban areas and the majority of the rural
areas in Brazil.
In order to evaluate the impact of the Social Security reform, we have used the closed
population of PNAD 2001. That is, we have estimated the present value of contributions of current
active workers in 2001 and the present value of their expected benefits, and the present value of the
benefit flow of the retired and/or survivors. We have included as currently active workers all
individuals over 15 years old, occupied in the week of reference of PNAD 2001, with strictly
positive main job earnings. The retired workers and survivors (from now on designated as
inactives) are the individuals who reported as retired workers or as survivors, with strictly positive
benefit values.
We have applied the following five-step procedure: (i) we have assigned the corresponding
social security contribution rate to the currently active workers; (ii) we have classified the inactive
individuals as either public sector or private sector inactives; (iii) we have estimated the earnings
growth rate through a log-wage equation; (iv) we have estimated the earnings profile for each
active worker using the estimated wage growth rate; (v) we have estimated the contribution and
benefit profiles for active workers using the estimated earnings profiles and applying the
corresponding social security pension rules. The benefit profiles of the current inactive ones were
estimated applying the social security rules over their reported benefits.
The non-behavioral micro-simulation consisted in applying the new social security rules over
the estimated wage profiles. Its non-behavioral characteristic comes from the hypothesis that the
wage profiles of the individuals do not change when social security rules change. That is, we
assume that individuals keep the same labor market position before and after the changes.
(i) Assigning the social security contribution rate to the current active workers
The contributions to the social security system come from the Brazilian payroll tax system. The
taxes to finance the social security system are divided into an employee tax and an employer tax.
Among the currently active workers, PNAD gathers information if an individual contributes to the
social security system and provides direct information such that we can divide them into two
groups: public sector workers and private sector workers. Public sector workers are divided into
federal, state, and local (municipality) workers. For each one, we assign the following tax rates:
a)  Public Sector Workers5
1)  Workers of the Federal Government:
• Employee: 11%
• Employer: 0%
2)  Workers of the State Governments:
• Both rates differentiated by states
3)  Workers of the Municipalities:
• Both rates differentiated by municipalities




b)  Private Sector Workers
1)  Formal workers (com carteira):
1.1)  Urban:
• Employee: 7.65% to 11%
• Employer: 20% + additional of work accident insurance (1% to 3%) + additional of finance
sector (2.5%)
1.2)  Rural:
• Employee: 7.65% to 11%
• Employer: It is not a payroll tax. It is a tax of the revenues differentiated by 621 activities
and states. We estimate the average revenues and average payrolls of each 621 sectors by
state using the Censo Agropecuario and RAIS. Then we apply the corresponding tax rates
to estimate the implicit payroll tax rate. The overall average is 9.3%.
2)  Self-employed (if contributes to the system):
• We assume 20% of one minimum wage
3)  Informal Workers (sem carteira and self-employed that does not contribute to the system):
• Employee: 0%
• Employer: 0%
(ii) Classifying inactive individuals into public sector and private sector inactives
For retired individual and for survivors, PNAD does not provide information about the sector
were the individual had worked when he/she was an active worker. However, we do know that the
ceiling of the benefit of private sector social security system (INSS) was R$ 1,430.00 in 2001.
Thus, we could have assumed that everybody with a declared benefit above R$1,430.00 would
come from the public sector. But when we have compared the results of this classification with the
numbers of beneficiaries and the total value of the benefits with actual data, we have realized that
this assumption would overestimate the figures in the public sector. Then, as an attempt to match
with the actual numbers, we have applied the following rule:
•  If the value of the retirement benefit is greater then 0,67*1,430 then the individual comes
from the public sector. Otherwise he/she comes from the private sector.
•  If the value of the survivor benefit is greater then 0,5*1,430 then the individual comes from
the public sector. Otherwise comes from the private sector.
(iii) Estimating the earnings growth rate with a log-earnings equation
We have estimated an OLS regression of log-earnings on time in the labor market and other
controls. The dependent variable is the main job earnings. PNAD provides information about the
age the individual entered the labor market. We have defined time in the labor market as age minus
age the individual entered the labor market. We have included among the controls variables
dummy variables for the individual position in the labor market. Each position corresponds to
different sets of social security rules. Positions are: civil servant, military, formal wage worker6
(com carteira), informal wage worker (sem carteira), formal domestic worker, informal domestic
worker, formal self-employed (contributes to the social security system), informal self-employed,
formal employer, informal employer, and professor in the public sector. Reference dummy for
position in the labor market is formal worker. Additional controls are the full interaction of the
years of schooling and age started to work and their squared values, and gender, race and locality
indicator variables (North region is the reference dummy). Table 2 shows the regression results.
Table 2
OLS Log-Earnings Regression
Variable Coeff. Standard Error
Intercept 4.8878 0.0217
Time 0.01315 0.0002
Position in the labor market
Militaries 0.2549 0.0269
Civil servants 0.1782 0.0079
Informal workers -0.3365 0.0053
Formal private household workers -0.0885 0.0126
Informal private household workers -0.5294 0.0085
Self-employed (contribute) 0.2601 0.0105
Self-employed (does not contribute) -0.3859 0.0054
Employer (contribute) 0.7943 0.0120
Employer (does not contribute) 0.4628 0.0132
Teacher -0.2347 0.0102
Years of Schooling 0.0583 0.0032
(Years of Schooling)
2 0.0045 0.0001
Age Started to Work 0.0611 0.0020
(Age Started to Work)
2 Squared -0.0010 0.0000
Schooling*Age St. to Work -0.0046 0.0002
(Schooling*Age St. to Work)
2 0.00001 0.00000
Non-White Dummy -0.1437 0.0041
Female Dummy -0.4593 0.0043
Location Dummies
Rural Dummy -0.1170 0.0066
Metropolitan Areas 0.1516 0.0040
Northeast region -0.3024 0.0067
Southeast Region 0.0336 0.0067
South Region -0.0019 0.0076
Central west region 0.1250 0.0078
Agricultural Sector -0.2579 0.0075
Obs 142713
R-Squared 0.5326
We are mainly interested in the estimated coefficient for the return on time in the labor market
(measured in number of years). The estimated coefficient is 0.01315, indicating that on the average,
individual earnings growth by 1.315% per year. We have used this growth rate to forecast the wage
profile of each individual. for the remaining years in the labor market, until retirement..7
(iv) Estimating the earnings and benefit profiles for each active worker using the estimated
earnings growth rate
We know the individual main job earnings in 2001, his or her age that started to work and
estimated the earnings growth rate in 1.315% a year. If we define W01 the predicted earnings in
2001 obtained from the parameters estimated of the above regression, we can obtain the present
value (in 2001) of predicted earnings in time t by using the equation Wt = W01 exp{(0.01315-r)*t}
where r is an assumed discount rate and t = 0 is the year 2001. We use different values for r: 0.03,
0.04, 0.05, and 0.06.
The total time of the individual in the labor market is assumed to be the number of years
between the age the individual declared to have started to work and the his or her age of retirement.
The age of retirement is obtained by assuming that the individual does not change over the years
his or her position of occupation in 2001. Given the individuals’ position of occupation, we can
indicate his or her expected age of retirement by using the current social security rules to his or her
particular position of occupation. For example, if an individual is a 30 year-old male formal wage
worker in 2001 that declares to have started to work at the age of Twenty, we assume that he has
been a formal wage worker since 20 years old and will stay a formal wage worker until he retires. It
means that we assume that he will have to contribute to social security system for 35 years to be
eligible to a benefit. Assuming that he started to contribute to the social security system when he
was 20 years old, he will then retire when he is 20 + 35 = 55 years old. Similar procedures are
applied to all other positions of occupation.
Also, we assume that each individual will survive his or her life expectancy given his or her
age in 2001. We use the life expectancy tables of IBGE, which differentiates the life expectancy by
age and gender. Furthermore, if a male individual is married in 2001 we give him a five-year
additional time to take into account the additional survivor benefit years of his spouse. Five years
seems to be the average years for a widow benefit in Brazil.
(v)Estimating the contribution and benefit profiles for active workers using the estimated
earnings profiles and applying the social security rules
Finally, knowing the earnings profile of each worker, his or her position of occupation, his or
her age of retirement and life expectancy, we can estimate the contribution to the social security
system and the benefit value accordingly. If an individual is in the public sector, we assign the
value of the earnings at the age of retirement as the benefit. Given the public sector rules, we
assume that this benefit grows at the same rate of the earnings growth rate. On the other hand, if an
individual is in the private sector, we calculate his or her benefit value that corresponds to the rules
of the social security system. For instance, if the individual is a formal wage worker, we assign the
average of the highest 80% earnings. If the individual is in the informal sector, we assign as a
benefit one minimum wage.
III. The Social Security Reform
The social security reform proposed by the Brazilian Federal Government in April 2003 to the
House of Representatives had the following proposed changes:
Public Sector Regime:
•  End of integrality and parity. The value of the benefits is the average of the 80% highest wages
up to a ceiling of R$2,400.00 (the same formula used in INSS).
•  Unification of contribution rate (11%).
•  Earnings ceiling is set at R$ 17.170.
•  For the new civil servants, benefits ceiling set at R$ 2400,00.
•  For the retired and new civil servants, survivor benefits ceiling is 70% of the survivors benefit.8
•  Minimum age of retirement: 60 (men) and 55 (women). Civil servants hired prior to 1998, may
retire at 53 Men) or 48 (women), with a reduction of 5% on the benefit value for each year of
anticipation, up to 35% ceiling in the reduction of benefit value.
2
•  11% contribution rate for pensions above R$900,00.
•  Current and future civil servants will contribute 11% of their salaries, for a complementary,
fully funded pension fund.
Private Sector Regime (INSS)
•  The ceiling of the wage/salary contribution and benefit is raised to R$ 2,400.00.
The House of Representatives approved the bill, with a very important change: it removed the
provision that had ended the parity and integrality right. Thus, current civil servants kept the right
to retire with full salary, and also kept the right to adjust benefits in the same proportion of
adjustment of salaries for active civil servants. For new entrants, however, the House kept the
R$2.400,00 ceiling on the value of benefits. The modified proposal was sent to the Senate where it
a new change was added: for each additional year of contribution above 35 years, the public
servant can reduce a corresponding one year from the minimum age of retirement.
3
V - The Micro-Simulations: Fiscal impacts
In order to simulate the fiscal impacts of these measures, we calculate the sum of all
individuals’ present value of their contributions as well as the sum of all individuals’ present value
of benefits. Their difference is the Net Present Value
4. The graphics 2 and 3 below illustrate this for
both actives and inactives. The difference between the sum of all individuals’ (actives and
inactives) present values of benefits and the sum of all actives present values of contributions is the
implicit surplus or debt of the system.
The fiscal impact of the reform is obtained by performing the following counterfactual
exercise: what would be the new present value of contributions and benefits of all individual
(actives and inactives) of the “closed population” of PNAD 2001 if the measures proposed were
implemented from 2001 and on? We compare these results with the current situation.
The impacts of each measure of the original reform and the overall impact are presented in
Tables 3a-3d below. Each Table corresponds to the use of discount rate from 3% to 6% a year,
respectively. Tables 4a-4d present the results for the reform approved in the House of
Representatives and Tables 5a-5d, the results for the reform approved in the Senate.
The impacts are measured in units of Brazil 2001 GDP. The first three columns show the
impacts on the private sector regime; the next three columns present the impacts on the public
sector regime, and the last column show the overall impact. Each line presents the ceteris paribus
impact of a measure, and the last three lines the total impact of all measures together. Note that the
last line presents the impacts on percentage of the total debt. For instance, Table 3a shows the
results of the original proposal when the discount rate of 3% is used. Its first line presents the
results for the current situation, that is, the debt of the current system before the reform. The
implicit debt in the private sector regime is 1.74 GDPs. Of this total, 1.01 corresponds to the
implicit debt of the active workers and 0.73 is what should be paid the current inactives in this
                                                
2 Civil servants hired after the passage of the reform may retire according to CA 20 provisions: 35 years of contribution
and minimum age of 60 (men) or 55 (women).
3 For a detailed explanation of the original bill, and of the versions passed in the House of Representatives and in the
Senate, see respectively MPAS (2003b), MPAS (2003c) e MPS (2004a).
4 This concept is analogous to the concept of Net Social Security Wealth, presented in the classic text by Feldstein
(1974).9
system. Also, the total implicit debt of the public sector regime is 1.41 GDPs and the total implicit
debt of the system is 3.15 GDP (last column).
Graphic 2


























Among the initial measures proposed, the end of the integrality and parity, and the change in
the minimum age of retirement are the ones with the greatest impact on reducing the implicit debt
(0.20 and 0.15 GDPs, respectively). At the end, there is a reduction of 0.43 GDPs of the implicit
debt, which corresponds to a decrease of 13% of the total implicit debt of the closed population of
2001.
Tables 4a-4d and 5a-5d introduce the changes made in the House of Representatives and in the
Senate, respectively. There is a reduction on the overall impacts. The proposal approved in the
House of Representatives would have had an impact of 10.6% decrease in the total implicit debt
and the reform approved in the Senate has an impact of 8% decrease in the total implicit debt.
Changes in the House and in the Senate reduced the fiscal impact of the original government
proposal by 21,5% and 40,7% respectively. Note that the bulk of the impacts occur in the public
sector regime and the use of different discount rates changes the levels of the impacts but not the
relative impact of the implicit debt. Even though the initial impact was considerably reduced, the
gains of the reform are not little, at all. When taken into consideration only the Civil Servants10
System, the reduction in the implicit debt would have been 31,3% in the original proposal, and was
reduced to 24,9% in the House, and to 19% in the Senate. Thus, Lula reform has reduced the
implicit debt in the Civil Servants System by about 1/5th, which is an expressive result, probably
never reached in any other Social Security Reform in the world.
TABLE 3a
Fiscal Impact of the Original Reform (# of GDPs)
(Discount Rate of 3%)
Private Sector Regime Public Sector Regime Total Measures
Actives Inactives Total Actives Inactives Total
Current Situation 1.01 0.73 1.74 0.72 0.69 1.41 3.15
- End of Integrality and Parity -0.20 -0.20 -0.20
- Minimum Age of Retirement -0.15 -0.15 -0.15
- Contribution of Inactives -0.03 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10
- Reduction of the Survivor Benefit -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03
- Unification of Contribution Tax Rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Ceilings for Wages and Benefits
- Ceiling of the private sector regime 0.02 0.02 0.02
Debt after reform 1.03 0.73 1.76 0.36 0.61 0.97 2.73
Impact (GDPs) 0.02 0.02 -0.36 -0.08 -0.44 -0.43
Impact (%) 1.6 0.0 0.9 -49.8 -12.0 -31.3 -13.5
TABLE 3b
Fiscal Impact of the Original Reform (# of GDPs)
(Discount Rate of 4%)
Private Sector Regime Public Sector Regime Total Measures
Actives Inactives Total Actives Inactives Total
Current Situation 0.75 0.67 1.41 0.58 0.63 1.20 2.62
- End of Integrality and Parity -0.16 -0.16 -0.16
- Minimum Age of Retirement -0.13 -0.13 -0.13
- Contribution of Inactives -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09
- Reduction of the Survivor Benefit -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
- Unification of Contribution Tax Rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Ceilings for Wages and Benefits
- Ceiling of the private sector regime 0.01 0.01 0.01
Debt after reform 0.76 0.67 1.43 0.29 0.55 0.84 2.27
Impact (GDPs) 0.01 0.01 -0.29 -0.07 -0.36 -0.35
Impact (%) 1.8 0.0 1.0 -50.1 -11.9 -30.2 -13.4
TABLE 3c
Fiscal Impact of the Original Reform (# of GDPs)
(Discount Rate of 5%)
Private Sector Regime Public Sector Regime Total Measures
Actives Inactives Total Actives Inactives Total
Current Situation 0.55 0.61 1.16 0.47 0.57 1.04 2.21
- End of Integrality and Parity -0.12 -0.12 -0.12
- Minimum Age of Retirement -0.12 -0.12 -0.12
- Contribution of Inactives -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08
- Reduction of the Survivor Benefit -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
- Unification of Contribution Tax Rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Ceilings for Wages and Benefits
- Ceiling of the private sector regime 0.01 0.01 0.01
Debt after reform 0.56 0.61 1.18 0.23 0.51 0.74 1.91
Impact (GDP's) 0.01 0.01 -0.24 -0.07 -0.30 -0.29
Impact (%) 2.0 0.0 0.9 -50.5 -11.8 -29.2 -13.311
TABLE 3d
Fiscal Impact of the Original Reform (# of GDPs)
(Discount Rate of 6%)
Private Sector Regime Public Sector Regime Total Measures
Actives Inactives Total Actives Inactives Total
Current Situation 0.41 0.57 0.97 0.38 0.53 0.91 1.88
- End of Integrality and Parity -0.10 -0.10 -0.10
- Minimum Age of Retirement -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
- Contribution of Inactives -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
- Reduction of the Survivor Benefit -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Unification of Contribution Tax Rate
- Ceilings for Wages and Benefits
- Ceiling of the private sector regime 0.01 0.01 0.01
Debt after reform 0.42 0.57 0.98 0.19 0.46 0.65 1.64
Impact (GDPs) 0.01 0.01 -0.20 -0.06 -0.26 -0.25
Impact (%) 2.2 0.0 0.9 -51.0 -11.7 -28.3 -13.2
TABLE 4a
Fiscal Impact of the Reform Approved in the House of Representatives (# of GDPs)
(Discount Rate of 3%)
Private Sector Regime Public Sector Regime Total Measures
Actives Inactives Total Actives Inactives Total
 Current Situation 1.01 0.73 1.74 0.72 0.69 1.41 3.15
- End of Integrality and Parity
- Minimum Age of Retirement -0.24 -0.24 -0.24
- Contribution of Inactives -0.02 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10
- Reduction of the Survivor Benefit -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
- Unification of Contribution Tax Rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Ceilings for Wages and Benefits
- Ceiling of the private sector regime 0.02 0.02 0.02
Debt after reform 1.03 0.73 1.76 0.45 0.61 1.06 2.82
Impact (GDPs) 0.02 0.02 -0.27 -0.08 -0.35 -0.33
Impact % 1.6 0.0 0.9 -37.3 -12.0 -24.9 -10.6
TABLE 4b
Fiscal Impact of the Reform Approved in the House of Representatives (# of GDPs)
(Discount Rate of 4%)
Private Sector Regime Public Sector Regime Total Measures
Actives Inactives Total Actives Inactives Total
 Current Situation 0.75 0.67 1.41 0.58 0.63 1.20 2.62
- End of Integrality and Parity
- Minimum Age of Retirement -0.20 0.00 -0.20 -0.20
- Contribution of Inactives -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09
- Reduction of the Survivor Benefit -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Unification of Contribution Tax Rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Ceilings for Wages and Benefits
- Ceiling of the private sector regime 0.01 0.01 0.01
Debt after reform 0.76 0.67 1.43 0.35 0.55 0.91 2.33
Impact (GDPs) 0.01 0.01 -0.22 -0.07 -0.30 -0.28
Impact % 1.8 0.0 1.0 -38.6 -11.9 -24.7 -10.912
TABLE 4c
Fiscal Impact of the Reform Approved in the House of Representatives (# of GDPs)
(Discount Rate of 5%)
Private Sector Regime Public Sector Regime Total Measures
Actives Inactives Total Actives Inactives Total
 Current Situation 0.55 0.61 1.16 0.47 0.57 1.04 2.20
- End of Integrality and Parity
- Minimum Age of Retirement -0.17 0.00 -0.17 -0.17
- Contribution of Inactives -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08
- Reduction of the Survivor Benefit -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Unification of Contribution Tax Rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Ceilings for Wages and Benefits
- Ceiling of the private sector regime 0.01 0.01 0.01
Debt after reform 0.56 0.61 1.18 0.28 0.51 0.79 1.96
Impact (GDPs) 0.01 0.01 -0.19 -0.07 -0.25 -0.24
Impact % 2.0 0.0 0.9 -39.9 -11.8 -24.5 -11.0
TABLE 4d
Fiscal Impact of the Reform Approved in the House of Representatives (# of GDPs)
(Discount Rate of 6%)
Private Sector Regime Public Sector Regime Total Measures
Actives Inactives Total Actives Inactives Total
 Current Situation 0.41 0.57 0.97 0.38 0.53 0.91 1.88
- End of Integrality and Parity
- Minimum Age of Retirement -0.14 -0.14 -0.14
- Contribution of Inactives -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
- Reduction of the Survivor Benefit -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Unification of Contribution Tax Rate
- Ceilings for Wages and Benefits
- Ceiling of the private sector regime 0.01 0.01 0.01
Debt after reform 0.42 0.57 0.98 0.22 0.46 0.69 1.67
Impact (GDPs) 0.01 0.01 -0.16 -0.06 -0.22 -0.21
Impact % 2.2 0.0 0.9 -41.4 -11.7 -24.2 -11.2
TABLE 5a
Fiscal Impact of the Reform Approved in the Senate (# of GDPs)
(Discount Rate of 3%)
Private Sector Regime Public Sector Regime Total Measures
Actives Inactives Total Actives Inactives Total
 Current Situation 1.01 0.73 1.74 0.72 0.69 1.41 3.15
- End of Integrality and Parity
- Minimum Age of Retirement -0.15 -0.15 -0.15
- Contribution of Inactives -0.02 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10
- Reduction of the Survivor Benefit -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
- Unification of Contribution Tax Rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Ceilings for Wages and Benefits
- Ceiling of the private sector regime 0.02 0.02 0.02
Debt after reform 1.03 0.73 1.76 0.54 0.61 1.14 2.90
Impact (GDPs) 0.02 0.02 -0.18 -0.08 -0.27 -0.25
Impact % 1.6 0.0 0.9 -25.6 -12.0 -19.0 -8.013
TABLE 5b
Fiscal Impact of the Reform Approved in the Senate (# of GDPs)
(Discount Rate of 4%)
Private Sector Regime Public Sector Regime Total Measures
Actives Inactives Total Actives Inactives Total
 Current Situation 0.75 0.67 1.41 0.58 0.63 1.20 2.62
- End of Integrality and Parity
- Minimum Age of Retirement -0.13 -0.13 -0.13
- Contribution of Inactives -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09
- Reduction of the Survivor Benefit -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Unification of Contribution Tax Rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Ceilings for Wages and Benefits
- Ceiling of the private sector regime 0.01 0.01 0.01
Debt after reform 0.76 0.67 1.43 0.42 0.55 0.97 2.40
Impact (GDPs) 0.01 0.01 -0.16 -0.07 -0.23 -0.22
Impact % 1.8 0.0 1.0 -27.1 -11.9 -19.2 -8.3
TABLE 5c
Fiscal Impact of the Reform Approved in the Senate (# of GDPs)
(Discount Rate of 5%)
Private Sector Regime Public Sector Regime Total Measures
Actives Inactives Total Actives Inactives Total
 Current Situation 0.55 0.61 1.16 0.47 0.57 1.04 2.20
- End of Integrality and Parity
- Minimum Age of Retirement -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
- Contribution of Inactives -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08
- Reduction of the Survivor Benefit -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Unification of Contribution Tax Rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Ceilings for Wages and Benefits
- Ceiling of the private sector regime 0.01 0.01 0.01
Debt after reform 0.56 0.61 1.18 0.33 0.51 0.84 2.01
Impact (GDPs) 0.01 0.01 -0.13 -0.07 -0.20 -0.19
Impact % 2.0 0.0 0.9 -28.7 -11.8 -19.4 -8.7
TABLE 5d
Fiscal Impact of the Reform Approved in the Senate (# of GDPs)
(Discount Rate of 6%)
Private Sector Regime Public Sector Regime Total Measures
Actives Inactives Total Actives Inactives Total
 Current Situation 0.41 0.57 0.97 0.38 0.53 0.91 1.88
- End of Integrality and Parity
- Minimum Age of Retirement -0.10 -0.10 -0.10
- Contribution of Inactives -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
- Reduction of the Survivor Benefit -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
- Unification of Contribution Tax Rate
- Ceilings for Wages and Benefits
- Ceiling of the private sector regime 0.01 0.01 0.01
Debt after reform 0.42 0.57 0.98 0.27 0.46 0.73 1.71
 Impact (GDPs) 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.12 -0.06 -0.18 -0.17
Impact % 2.2 0.0 0.9 -30.5 -11.7 -19.6 -9.014
VI - Estimation of balancing and effective contribution rate
The next exercise is to estimate the contribution rate that would balance the system. That is, the
contribution rate that would equalize the present value of the contributions and the present value of
the benefits. The present value of the wages and earnings is calculated since the individual entered
the labor market until his or her age of retirement. The Graphic below illustrates how the












Balancing Contribution Rate= PVB / PVW
We have estimated the balancing contribution rate for the current situation (before Lula
Reform), for the system approved in the Senate for the current workers, and for the system
approved for the new entrants. The last two simulations answer the following question: how
balanced would be the system if it had existed since the current closed population entered the labor
market? Both simulations assume the occupation structure and earnings profiles are the same as the
ones observed in the population 2001 and do not change due to the social security reform. Tables
6a to 6d present the results for the discount rates of 3% to 6% percent, respectively. For
comparison purpose, we also included the effective contribution rate actually paid in each case. The
effective rate is the present value of the contributions divided by the present value of the earnings.
In the current situation, informal workers do not contribute (effective tax rate is 0%) and the
balancing tax rate would be 7.7%, using the discount rate of 3%. The private sector regime pays
22.5% and would required 17.1%. The public sector regime pays 15.5% and would require 67.3%.
Clearly, the public sector regime is imbalanced, and the private sector regime is not imbalanced if
the benefits for the informal workers were not included in this regime.
The Senate reform reduces the discrepancies in the public sector regime for the current workers
rules, but the system is still not balanced. The public sector regime system adopted for the new
entrants seems to be almost balanced.
                                                
5 The procedure is similar to the one used by Desmet el al. (2003), to estimate the impact of changes in Social Security
in Belgium.15
Table 6a
Balancing and effective contribution rate
(Discount rate of 3%)
  Current Situation Senate Reform New Entrants
 Balancing EffectiveBalancing EffectiveBalancing Effective
Informal 7.7% 0.0% 7.7% 0.0% 7.7% 0.0%
INSS 17.1% 22.5% 17.3% 22.5% 17.4% 22.6%
Publ. Serv. 67.3% 15.5% 47.3% 18.9% 22.7% 17.2%
-Judiciary 59.1% 14.6% 42.0% 18.6% 22.0% 16.3%
-Legislative 57.7% 13.9% 40.9% 16.5% 22.0% 14.6%
-Executive 69.3% 16.2% 48.2% 19.6% 23.0% 17.8%
-Military 56.9% 8.5% 43.0% 11.0% 20.3% 11.0%
-Others 55.9% 19.4% 42.9% 23.8% 23.0% 22.1%
Table 6b
Balancing and effective contribution rate
(Discount rate of 4%)
Current Situation Senate Reform New Entrants
 Balancing EffectiveBalancing EffectiveBalancing Effective
Informal 5.5% 0.0%  5.5% 0.0% 5.5% 0.0%
INSS 12.7% 22.5% 12.9% 22.5% 12.9% 22.6%
Publ. Serv. 49.8% 15.5% 34.8% 18.9% 16.5% 17.2%
-Judiciary 43.6% 14.6% 31.1% 18.6% 16.0% 16.3%
-Legislative 42.6% 13.9% 30.3% 16.5% 16.1% 14.6%
-Executive 51.3% 16.2% 35.5% 19.6% 16.7% 17.8%
-Military 42.0% 8.5% 31.9% 11.0% 14.8% 11.0%
-Others 41.0% 19.4% 31.4% 23.8% 16.6% 22.1%
Table 6c
Balancing and effective contribution rate
(Discount rate of 5%)
  Current Situation Senate Reform New Entrants
 Balancing EffectiveBalancing EffectiveBalancing Effective
Informal 3.9% 0.0% 3.9% 0.0% 3.9% 0.0%
INSS 9.4% 22.5% 9.5% 22.5% 9.5% 22.6%
Publ. Serv. 36.7% 15.5% 25.5% 18.9% 11.9% 17.2%
-Judiciary 32.0% 14.6% 22.9% 18.6% 11.6% 16.3%
-Legislative 31.3% 13.9% 22.3% 16.5% 11.7% 14.6%
-Executive 37.9% 16.2% 26.0% 19.6% 12.1% 17.8%
-Military 30.9% 8.5% 23.4% 11.0% 10.6% 11.0%
-Others 29.8% 19.4% 22.8% 23.8% 11.9% 22.1%
Table 6d
Balancing and effective contribution rate
(Discount rate of 6%)
Current Situation Senate Reform New Entrants
 Balancing EffectiveBalancing Effective Balancing Effective
Informal 2.7% 0.0% 2.7% 0.0% 2.7% 0.0%
INSS 6.9% 22.5% 7.0% 22.5% 7.0% 22.6%
Publ. Serv. 27.0% 15.5% 18.6% 18.9% 8.6% 17.2%
-Judiciary 23.4% 14.6% 16.8% 18.6% 8.3% 16.3%
-Legislative 22.9% 13.9% 16.3% 16.5% 8.4% 14.6%
-Executive 27.9% 16.2% 18.9% 19.6% 8.7% 17.8%
-Military 22.5% 8.5% 17.1% 11.0% 7.6% 11.0%
-Others 21.6% 19.4% 16.4% 23.8% 8.4% 22.1%16
VII - Final Remarks
Results provide two main conclusions. First, the reform originally proposed by the government
has lost a significant part of its impact during the passage in the Congress. Particularly two changes
have made the great part of the losses: the on that kept integrality and parity (in the House of
Representatives), and the one that introduced a transition rule for minimum age of retirement (in
the Senate). Even though, CA 41 will allow for a reduction in the implicit debt of about 8%. Taking
into account the prevailing imbalances prior to reform, this reduction may be regarded as an
expressive gain for the government and a progress towards transforming Brazilian Social Security
into a more equitable system in the long run. Furthermore, it should be remarked that the reform
was reached in the first year of Lula administration, a small period, when compared to previous
attempts of other administrations.
Second, prior to the reform, balancing contribution rates in the public sector contrasted sharply
with the effective rates. This is the hidden face of the deficit in the public sector system. After the
reform, the balancing contribution rates have been reduced, particularly for the new entrants, and
the resulting system will be a smaller burden to public finance. Thus, an important step has been
made to introduce fairness in the Social Security system in Brazil.
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